Germany, in Düsseldorf
A 46 between Heinsberg and Wuppertal
Year opened:
1983
Length:
1,026m
Portal height level:
38 / 39m above sea level
Number of tubes:
2 / unidirectional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
70,296
Share of HGVs:
9.3%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
No data available/ 13/ 0
Risk:
High
Strengths and weaknesses
Two tubes with cross-connections as additional escape and rescue routes every 80 metres
Emergency lane along the entire length of the tunnel
Emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 160 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the fire brigade is notified
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communication possible throughout the tunnel for both the police and the fire brigade
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
No traffic lights and barriers in front of the portals
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
No loudspeakers
No video surveillance
Traffic and traffic disruptions are not automatically detected nor is the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
In the event of fire, the tunnel is not automatically closed
No regular emergency drills
!
Knock-out criterion! The test result was lowered from Acceptable to Poor due to the very poor result in the categories of Traffic and traffic surveillance and Communication (refer to Methodology: How we tested).
Plans for the future
2009:
Replacement and enhancement of the traffic systems, including a system to close the tunnel
Installation of video surveillance, loudspeakers, traffic radio throughout the tunnel, as well as emergency phones and hydrants at the portals
Regular emergency drills
Briefly and to the point
The high risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the high traffic volume of more than 70,000 vehicles per day and the unrestricted transport of hazardous goods.
Unidirectional traffic, sufficiently wide lanes, emergency lanes and lighting are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff. However, there is no video surveillance system.
Incidents in the tunnel are not automatically reported to the tunnel control centre. There is also no traffic radio or loudspeakers to inform motorists if necessary. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires at least, activates ventilation, and notifies the fire brigade. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. At least the emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services.
In the event of fire, there are good preventative measures in place to facilitate effective self-rescue. The ventilation system draws smoke out of the tube affected in the direction of traffic to a zone where there are usually no people.Anybody downstream from the fire is located in a smoke-free zone and can leave the tunnel through the clearly marked emergency exits.
Germany, near Friedland
A 38 between Göttingen and Halle
Year opened:
2006
Length:
1,725m
Portal height level:
280 / 301m above sea level
Number of tubes:
2 / unidirectional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
15,000
Share of HGVs:
22%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
12/ 0/ 0
Risk:
Low
Strengths and weaknesses
Two tubes with cross-connections as additional escape and rescue routes every 300 metres
No hazardous goods transported through the tunnel
Traffic lights and barriers in front of the portals
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Lay-bys provided every 600 metres
Sound-insulated emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 150 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated, the tunnel closed and the fire brigade is notified
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Access for rescue vehicles to the neighbouring tube every 600 metres
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
Fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
Plans for the future
Installation of variable information displays at the portals, impact protection in the lay-bys and stationary speed monitoring
Briefly and to the point
The low risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the relatively low traffic volume of around 15,000 vehicles per day and the ban on the transport of hazardous goods. However, the HGV share of 22 percent is relatively high.
Unidirectional traffic, sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the very good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs along with information provided via traffic radio and loudspeakers. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, closes the tunnel and notifies the fire brigade. Good training and equipment for the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. An emergency response plan and regular drills ensure good co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services.
In the event of fire, there are good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system draws smoke out of the tube affected in the direction of traffic to a zone where there are usually no people.Anybody downstream from the fire is located in a smoke-free zone and can leave the tunnel through the clearly marked emergency exits.
Germany, near Wolfach
B 294 between Hausach and Schiltach
Year opened:
1993
Length:
1,256m
Portal height level:
270 / 281m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
70kph
Vehicles per day:
9,200
Share of HGVs:
15%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
No data available/ 0/ 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance
Lay-bys on opposite sides every 412 metres
Emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 140 metres
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Regular training for tunnel staff
No loudspeakers
No automatic detection of traffic disruptions, nor of lay-by use
No additional escape or rescue routes
No evacuation lighting for tunnel escape route, nor signs showing the escape direction and distance to the portals
Local power supply is not protected against power cuts
Emergency response plan incomplete
No regular emergency drills
The maximum time of use for the fire brigade's respiratory equipment is too short
Plans for the future
2010:
A parallel rescue gallery with eight cross connections is to be built
2011:
New lighting, ventilation and fire alarm system, replacement and enhancement of the central control system, traffic equipment, measuring equipment, video surveillance and power supply, expansion of tunnel radio
Installation of LEDs, loudspeakers and an automatic closing system
Escape routes to be marked by evacuation lighting
Installation of water retention equipment for tunnel drainage
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the low traffic volume of 9,200 vehicles per day and a tunnel length of only around 1.3 kilometres. The HGV share of 15% is, however, relatively high, as is the longitudinal gradient of 3.2 percent. And there are no restrictions on the transport of hazardous goods.
Sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
At least the use of an emergency phone or fire extinguisher is automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. Motorists are guided, if necessary, using traffic lights and receive information via traffic radio. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. However, the emergency response plan is incomplete and there are no regular drills, so that co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services is not sufficiently co-ordinated.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in a fire need badly to be improved. There are no additional emergency exits, there is no evacuation lighting for the escape routes in the tunnel,nor are there signs showing the escape direction and the distance to the nearest exit.
Traffic lights and barriers in front of the portals
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of emergency phones and fire extinguishers
Lay-bys provided every 420 metres
Emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 150 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated, the tunnel closed and the fire brigade is notified
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
Fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
No additional escape or rescue routes
Emergency response plan incomplete
!
Knock-out criterion! The test result was lowered from Good to Acceptable due to the very poor result in the Escape and rescue routes category (refer to Methodology: How we tested).
Plans for the future
By 2010: A parallel safety gallery is to be built
Rules to be introduced for the transport of hazardous goods
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due the relatively high traffic volume of more than 20,000 vehicles per day, resulting from bi-directional traffic, and the unrestricted transport of hazardous goods.
Sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs along with information provided via traffic radio and loudspeakers. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, closes the tunnel and notifies the fire brigade. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. Regular drills at least co-ordinate co-operation between the tunnel control centre and rescue services. The emergency response plan, however, is incomplete.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in the event of fire need to be improved. The ventilation system extracts smoke near the seat of the fire out of the tunnel, permitting people to go to a mostly smoke-free area, however, this is only possible via the portals which could be quite a long distance away. There are no additional emergency exits.
Austria, near St. Jakob
S 16/ Arlberg dual carriageway, between Landeck and Bludenz
Year opened:
1978
Length:
13,927m
Portal height level:
1,255 / 1,190m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
7,300
Share of HGVs:
13.4%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
32 / 1 / 1
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
Traffic lights and variable information displays in front of the portals
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Lay-bys provided every 848 metres
Sound-insulated emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 212 metresEvacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes; doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
Fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
The emergency exits via eight cross-connections to the parallel rail tunnel are too far apart (1,650 metre)
Plans for the future
Second phase of expanding the escape routes with a shorter distance of around 850 metres between emergency exits
After 2012: General refurbishment of the tunnel
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the low volume of traffic of 7,300 vehicles per day. However, the HGV share totals 13.4 percent and the tunnel has a length of almost 14 kilometres and is hence very long.
Sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and are provided with information by information displays at the portals, traffic radio and via loudspeakers. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. An emergency response plan and regular drills ensure good co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services.
In the event of fire, the necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue are relatively good. The ventilation system extracts the smoke near the seat of the fire out of the tunnel. This means that people can leave the tunnel through an area that is mostly smoke-free. The distance between emergency exits, however, is too long.
Austria, near Trebesing
A 10 between Salzburg and Villach
Year opened:
East tube 2006/ west tube 2007
Length:
848m
Portal height level:
724 / 740m above sea level
Number of tubes:
2 / unidirectional traffic
Speed limit:
100kph
Vehicles per day:
14,438
Share of HGVs:
22%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
1 / 0 / 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
Two tubes with cross-connections as additional escape and rescue routes every 145 metres max.
Traffic lights and variable information displays in front of the portals
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages (in several languages)
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of emergency lanes, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Emergency lanes the full length of the tunnel
Sound-insulated emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided around every 140 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes; doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
Fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
The power supply is not protected against power cuts
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the low traffic volume of 14,500 vehicles per day and unidirectional traffic, and a tunnel length of only around 848 metres. On the other hand, the HGV share of 22 percent is relatively high, and there are no restrictions on the transport of hazardous goods.
Unidirectional traffic, sufficiently wide lanes, emergency lanes and lighting are the main reasons for the very good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Any incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. The system used to analyse video images also enables the fast detection of smoke. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and are provided with information by information displays at the portals, traffic radio and via loudspeakers. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. An emergency response plan and regular drills ensure good co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services.
In the event of fire, there are good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system draws smoke out of the tube affected in the direction of traffic to a zone where there are usually no people.Anybody downstream from the fire is located in a smoke-free zone and can leave the tunnel through the clearly marked emergency exits.
Austria, near Spittal
A 10 between Salzburg and Villach
Year opened:
West tube 1973 / east tube 1985
Length:
950m
Portal height level:
657 / 629m above sea level
Number of tubes:
2 / unidirectional traffic
Speed limit:
100kph
Vehicles per day:
21,243
Share of HGVs:
18.4%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
3 / 2 / 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
Two tubes with unidirectional traffic
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of emergency phones and fire extinguishers
Emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 190 to 350 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
Fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
Lighting is too weak
No loudspeakers
Distance between emergency phones and fire extinguishers is up to 350 metres and hence too long
No additional escape or rescue routes
No automatic fire alarm system
Plans for the future
Autumn 2008 to 2009: General refurbishment of the tunnel
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the low traffic volume of around 21,300 vehicles per day and unidirectional traffic, and a tunnel length of only around 950 metres. The HGV share of 18.4 percent is relatively high, and there are no restrictions on the transport of hazardous goods.
The preventive measures must be individually evaluated. Unidirectional traffic, sufficiently wide lanes and video surveillance of the tunnel around the clock by trained staff in the tunnel control centre are positive measures. But poor lighting in the tunnel is a negative finding.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. Motorists are guided, if necessary, using traffic lights and receive information via traffic radio. There is no automatic fire alarm system; this means that in the event of fire, the ventilation is not automatically activated nor is the closing of the tunnel initiated. Good training and equipment for the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. An emergency response plan and regular drills ensure good co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in the event of fire need to be improved. The ventilation system draws smoke out of the tube affected in the direction of traffic to a zone where there are usually no people.Anybody downstream from the fire is located in a smoke-free zone; however, they can only leave the tunnel through the portals. There are no additional emergency exits.
Austria, near Modriach
A 2 between Graz and Klagenfurt
Year opened:
1982
Length:
2,013m
Portal height level:
1,026 / 1,055m above sea level
Number of tubes:
2 / unidirectional traffic
Speed limit:
100kph
Vehicles per day:
17,300
Share of HGVs:
22%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
15 / 3/ 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
Two tubes with cross-connections as additional escape and rescue routes every 307 to 382 metres
Traffic lights and variable information displays in front of the portals
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Lay-bys in the middle of the tunnel
Sound-insulated emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 212 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Rescue route for emergency service vehicles leading to neighbouring tube located in the middle of the tunnel
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
Fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the low volume of traffic of around 17,300 vehicles per day and unidirectional traffic. However, the HGV share of 22 percent is relatively high, and there are no restrictions on the transport of hazardous goods.
Unidirectional traffic, sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the very good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs, as well as by information displays at the portals, traffic radio and via loudspeakers. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. Good training and equipment for the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. An emergency response plan and regular drills ensure good co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services.
In the event of fire, there are good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system draws smoke out of the tube affected in the direction of traffic to a zone where there are usually no people.Anybody downstream from the fire is located in a smoke-free zone and can leave the tunnel through the clearly marked emergency exits.
Switzerland, near La Neuveville
N 5 between La Neuveville and Bienne
Year opened:
1989
Length:
2,510m
Portal height level:
434 / 436m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
13,100
Share of HGVs:
4.6%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
0 / 2 / 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Video surveillance with cameras around every 250 metres
Lay-bys on opposite sides every 720 metres
Sound-insulated emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 160 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes; doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Lighting is too weak
No loudspeakers
Neither traffic, traffic disruptions nor the use of lay-bys are automatically detected
The distance of 1,250 metres between emergency exits is too long
No regular emergency drills
Plans for the future
Revision of the ventilation plan
A parallel safety gallery with cross-connections every 300 metres is to be built
Tunnel to be extended to a length of around five kilometres
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the traffic volume of around 13,000 vehicles per day and bi-directional traffic, and a tunnel length of around 2.5 kilometres. Although there are no restrictions on the transport of hazardous goods, hazardous goods are not transported very often.
The preventive measures must be individually evaluated. Sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and surveillance of the tunnel by trained staff in the tunnel control centre, which is manned around the clock, are positive measures. Poor lighting and insufficient detection of traffic disruptions or emergencies are negative findings.
An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs along with information provided via traffic radio. Good fire fighting equipment and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. At least an emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services.
The ventilation system extracts the smoke near the seat of the fire out of the tunnel. This means that people can leave the tunnel through an area that is mostly smoke-free. The distance between emergency exits, however, is too long.
Scwitzerland, near Sachseln
A 8 between Lucerne and Berne
Year opened:
1997
Length:
5,190m
Portal height level:
474 / 479m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
8,377
Share of HGVs:
6.6%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
2 / 1 / 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages (in several languages)
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Lay-bys on opposite sides every 700 metres
Sound-insulated emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 150 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes; doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
Lighting is too weak
The distance of 2,590 metres between emergency exits is too long
Ventilation is not powerful enough to cope with a fire, ventilation control is not effective enough
The maximum time of use for the fire brigade's respiratory equipment is too short
!
Knock-out criterion! The test result was lowered from Good to Acceptable due to the very poor result in the Escape and rescue routes and Ventilation categories (refer to Methodology: How we tested).
Plans for the future
New lighting and new coating on tunnel walls
A parallel safety gallery with cross-connections every 300 metres is to be built
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the length of the tunnel, i.e. almost 5.2 kilometres, and a HGV share of 6.6 percent. Although there are no restrictions on the transport of hazardous goods, hazardous goods are not transported very often.
Sufficiently wide lanes and lay-bys are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff. Lighting, however, is too weak.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs along with information provided via traffic radio. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. An emergency response plan and regular drills ensure good co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in the event of fire are insufficient. The distance between emergency exits is too long. Moreover, the ventilation system warrants only limited smoke extraction.
Switzerland, near Altdorf
A 4 between Schwyz and Altdorf
Year opened:
2005
Length:
2,590m
Portal height level:
465 / 437m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
12,018
Share of HGVs:
5.5%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
6 / 0 / 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
Traffic lights and barriers in front of the portals
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Lay-bys on opposite sides every 650 metres
Sound-insulated emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 150 metres
Emergency exits provided every 270 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
Fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
No loudspeakers
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the traffic volume of around 12,000 vehicles per day and bi-directional traffic, a tunnel length of more than 2.5 kilometres, and the unrestricted transport of hazardous goods.
Sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Any incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs, as well as by information displays at the portals and traffic radio. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. An emergency response plan and regular drills ensure good co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services.
In the event of fire, there are very good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system extracts the smoke near the seat of the fire out of the tunnel. This means that people in the tube can use the well-signposted emergency exits to find their way to the safety galleries through a largely smoke-free zone.
Switzerland, near San Bernardino
A 13 between Splügen and Bellinzona
Year opened:
1967
Length:
6,596m
Portal height level:
1,613 / 1,631m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
6,548
Share of HGVs:
6.7%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
34 / 1 / 1
Risk:
Low
Strengths and weaknesses
No hazardous goods transported through the tunnel
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of emergency phone or fire extinguisher use
Lay-bys provided every 750 metres
Sound-insulated emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 250 metres
Emergency exits provided at least every 380 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes; doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Emergency response plan is complete
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
Tunnel fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
No loudspeakers
Plans for the future
End of 2010: Extension of the 50 kV installation
Briefly and to the point
The low risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the length of the tunnel, i.e. 6.6 kilometres, a HGV share of 6.7 percent and the long gradients in front of the tunnel.
Sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
At least the use of an emergency phone or fire extinguisher is automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs along with information provided via traffic radio. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. An emergency response plan and regular drills ensure good co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services.
In the event of fire, there are very good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system extracts the smoke near the seat of the fire out of the tunnel. This means that people in the tube can use the well-signposted emergency exits to escape to the air duct through a largely smoke-free zone.
Switzerland, near Locarno
A 13 between Bellinzona and Brissago
Year opened:
1996
Length:
5,530m
Portal height level:
211 / 201m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
22,259
Share of HGVs:
5%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
12 / 8 / 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
No hazardous goods transported through the tunnel
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Lay-bys provided every 640 metres
Sound-insulated emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 160 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
No loudspeakers
The distance of up to 740 metres between emergency exits is too long
No regular emergency drills
Plans for the future
2011:
Installation of variable information displays at the portals and video surveillance with automatic detection of traffic disruptions
Installation of new smoke extraction fans
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the traffic volume of around 22,500 vehicles per day and bi-directional traffic, and a tunnel length of around 5.5 kilometres.
Sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs along with information provided via traffic radio. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. Good training and equipment for the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. At least an emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnels control centre and emergency services. However, regular drills are not carried out.
In the event of fire, there are good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system extracts the smoke near the seat of the fire out of the tunnel. This means that people in the tube can use the emergency exits and escape through a largely smoke-free environment. However, the distance between emergency exits is too long.
Two tubes with cross-connections as additional escape and rescue routes every 370 metres
Traffic lights and variable information displays in front of the portals
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of emergency phones and fire extinguishers
Emergency lanes the full length of the tunnel
Emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 175 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes; doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, ventilation is automatically activated
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
Safety-relevant cables are not sufficiently fire-resistant
The power supply is not protected against power cuts
Radio communications are not possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
No regular emergency drills
The maximum time of use for the fire brigade's respiratory equipment is too short
Plans for the future
Ventilation and power supply are to be improved
Installation of video surveillance with image analysis and a system for traffic and tunnel radio
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to a HGV share of around 10 percent and the unrestricted transport of hazardous goods.
Unidirectional traffic, sufficiently wide lanes, emergency lanes and lighting are the main reasons for the very good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs, as well as by information displays at the portals and loudspeakers. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires and activates ventilation. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. At least an emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services. However, regular drills are not carried out.
In the event of fire, there are good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system draws smoke out of the tube affected in the direction of traffic to a zone where there are usually no people.Anybody downstream from the fire is located in a smoke-free zone and can leave the tunnel through the emergency exits. However, if conditions are unfavourable at the portals, it may be possible for smoke to enter the other tube.
Spain, near Guadarrama
AP 6 between Madrid and A Coruña
Year opened:
2007 (only the newest tube was tested)
Length:
3,148m
Portal height level:
1,275 / 1,229m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / unidirectional traffic
Speed limit:
100kph
Vehicles per day:
21,995
Share of HGVs:
14.3%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
10 / 2 / 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
One tube with unidirectional traffic (the tunnel comprises at total of three tubes with unidirectional traffic, only the newest tube was tested)
Traffic lights and barriers in front of the portals
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Lay-bys provided every 750 metres
Sound-insulated emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 125 metres
Emergency exits provided every 400 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Access for rescue vehicles to neighbouring tube every 600 metres
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
Fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the traffic volume of around 22,000 vehicles per day with unidirectional traffic, a HGV share of almost 15% and a tunnel length of around 3.1 kilometres.
Unidirectional traffic, sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the very good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs, as well as by information displays at the portals, traffic radio and via loudspeakers. An automatic fire alarm system is installed to detect fires. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. An emergency response plan and regular drills ensure good co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services.
In the event of fire, there are good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system draws smoke out of the tube affected in the direction of traffic to a zone where there are usually no people.Anybody downstream from the fire is located in a smoke-free zone and can leave the tunnel through the emergency exits.
Spain, near Aguilas
AP 7 between Cartagena and Vera
Year opened:
2007
Length:
1,797m
Portal height level:
270 / 270m above sea level
Number of tubes:
2 / unidirectional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
2,760
Share of HGVs:
12.2%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
0 / 0 / 0
Risk:
Low
Strengths and weaknesses
Two tubes with cross-connections as additional escape and rescue routes every 360 metres
Traffic lights and barriers in front of the portals
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of emergency lanes, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Emergency lanes the full length of the tunnel
Emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 125 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, ventilation is automatically activated
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Access for rescue vehicles to neighbouring tube every 360 metres
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
No regular emergency drills
Plans for the future
Installation of a traffic radio system, also making it possible to broadcast additional messages, and a mobile radio system
Regular emergency drills
Briefly and to the point
The low risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the low traffic volume of 3,000 vehicles per day and unidirectional traffic, and a tunnel length of only 1.8 kilometres. The HGV share of more than 12 percent is relatively high. Although there are no restrictions on the transport of hazardous goods, hazardous goods are not transported very often.
Unidirectional traffic, sufficiently wide lanes, emergency lanes and lighting are the main reasons for the very good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs, as well as by information displays at the portals and loudspeakers. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires and activates ventilation. Good training and equipment for the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. At least an emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnels control centre and emergency services.
In the event of fire, there are good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system draws smoke out of the tube affected in the direction of traffic to a zone where there are usually no people.Anybody downstream from the fire is located in a smoke-free zone and can leave the tunnel through the clearly marked emergency exits.
Spain, near Torrox
A 7 between Cadiz and Barcelona
Year opened:
2002
Length:
1,152m
Portal height level:
159 / 128m above sea level
Number of tubes:
2 / unidirectional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
16,253
Share of HGVs:
10.3%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
8 / 3 / 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
Two tubes with cross-connections as additional escape and rescue routes every 410 metres
Traffic lights and variable information displays in front of the portals
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions and use of emergency phones
Lay-by in the middle of the east tube and an emergency lane provided along the entire length of the west tube
Emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 192 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, ventilation is automatically activated
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Access for rescue vehicles to neighbouring tube every 410 metres
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
Safety-relevant cables are not sufficiently fire-resistant
The power supply is not protected against power cuts
Radio communications are not possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
No regular emergency drills
The maximum time of use for the fire brigade's respiratory equipment is too short
Plans for the future
Ventilation and power supply are to be improved
Installation of state-of-the-art video surveillance with image analysis and a system for traffic and tunnel radio
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to a HGV share of around 10 percent and the unrestricted transport of hazardous goods.
Unidirectional traffic, sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys or emergency lanes and lighting are the main reasons for the very good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs, as well as by information displays at the portals and loudspeakers. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires and activates ventilation. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. At least an emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services. However, regular drills are not carried out.
In the event of fire, there are good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system draws smoke out of the tube affected in the direction of traffic to a zone where there are usually no people.Anybody downstream from the fire is located in a smoke-free zone and can leave the tunnel through the emergency exits. However, if conditions are unfavourable at the portals, it may be possible for smoke to enter the other tube.
Spain, near Pola de Lena
AP 66 between Oviedo and León
Year opened:
West tube in 1983/ east tube in 1991
Length:
1,453m
Portal height level:
1,050 / 1,100m above sea level
Number of tubes:
2 / unidirectional traffic
Speed limit:
100kph
Vehicles per day:
11,000
Share of HGVs:
15.9%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
95 / 12 / 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
Two tubes with unidirectional traffic
Traffic lights and barriers in front of the portals
Full video surveillance
Lay-bys provided every 130 metres in the one tube and an emergency lane provided the entire length of the other tube
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-by/emergency lanes, emergency phones and fire extinguishers
Emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 130 metres
Automatic fire alarm system with video surveillance, in the event of fire, ventilation is automatically activated
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Lighting is too weak
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
No loudspeakers
No automatic traffic detection
No additional escape or rescue routes
No evacuation lighting for tunnel escape route, no signs showing the escape direction and distance to the portals
Ventilation control in the event of fire is not sufficiently effective
No continuous fire-fighting water supply in the tunnel, no hydrants
Safety-relevant cables are not sufficiently fire-resistant
No emergency power supply
Radio communications for the police are not possible throughout the tunnel
No regular emergency drills
The time it takes the fire brigade to arrive is too long: 35 minutes
Plans for the future
Lighting is to be improved
Installation of a traffic radio system, also making it possible to broadcast additional messages, and an uninterruptible power supply
Installation of additional emergency exits
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the low traffic volume of around 11,000 vehicles per day with unidirectional traffic and a tunnel length of only around 1.5 kilometres. However, the HGV share is almost 16 percent, and there are no restrictions on the transport of hazardous goods.
Unidirectional traffic, sufficiently wide lanes and lay-bys are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff. Lighting, however, is too weak.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and information is provided by information displays at the portals. Video surveillance can be used to detect fires, ventilation and closing the tunnel must be manually activated. The long time that it takes for the fire brigade to arrive and the lack of fire-fighting water make fire fighting difficult. At least an emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services. However, regular drills are not carried out.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in a fire need to be improved badly. The ventilation system draws smoke out of the tube affected in the direction of traffic to a zone where there are usually no people.Anybody downstream from the fire is located in a smoke-free zone; however, they can only leave the tunnel through the portals. There are no additional emergency exits.
Norway, near Vikanes
E 39 between Bergen and Oppedal
Year opened:
1980
Length:
4,910m
Portal height level:
15 / 90m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
1,970
Share of HGVs:
14%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
0 / 0 / 0
Risk:
Low
Strengths and weaknesses
Lay-bys provided every 1 600 metres
Emergency phones provided every 500 metres and fire extinguishers every 250 metres
Escape route signs show the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Lighting is too weak
Lanes are too narrow: 3 metres wide
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
No loudspeakers
No video surveillance
No automatic detection of traffic, nor of the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
No emergency lighting
The distance of 1,600 metres between lay-bys is relatively long, lay-bys are relatively small
The distance of 500 metres between emergency phones is too long
No additional escape or rescue routes
No evacuation lighting to mark escape routes in the tunnel
No automatic fire alarm system
Ventilation is not powerful enough to cope with a fire, ventilation control is not effective enough
The ventilation section for longitudinal ventilation runs the entire length of the tunnel, i.e. 4,910 metres, and is hence very long
No continuous fire-fighting water supply in the tunnel, no hydrants
Safety-relevant cables are not sufficiently fire-resistant
No system in place to quickly drain flammable and toxic liquids
Radio communications are not possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
No regular emergency drills
Plans for the future
By 2017:
Escape routes to be marked by evacuation lighting
Installation of video surveillance with automatic detection of traffic disruptions, communication systems and evacuation lighting
Emergency phones and ventilation to be replaced
Installation of three more lay-bys
Briefly and to the point
The low risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the low volume of traffic of around 2,000 vehicles per day with bi-directional traffic. The tunnel, however, is almost 5 kilometres long and has a HGV share of 14 percent.
Preventive measures are limited to the presence of trained staff in the tunnel control centre which is manned around the clock. Apart from this, lighting is too weak, the distance between lay-bys is too long and there is no video surveillance.
Incidents in the tunnel are not automatically reported to the tunnel control centre. Tunnel staff are forced to rely on reports made by motorists using either the emergency phones or their own mobile phones. Due to the lack of video surveillance, the tunnel control centre is unable to gain a complete picture of the situation in the tunnel. Motorists are guided, if necessary, merely by traffic lights at the portals. Fire-fighting is difficult due to the lack of fire-fighting water in the tunnel. At least an emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in a fire need to be improved badly. The long ventilation section, which runs the entire length of the tunnel, i.e. 4,910 metres, cannot prevent smoke located a long distance from the seat of the fire from moving downwards from the tunnel ceiling. Moreover, longitudinal flow in the tunnel is not considered in ventilation control. These two aspects can lead to smoke spreading throughout the entire tunnel and this is dangerous in light of the long distance to be covered to the portals.
Norway, near Matre
E 39 between Bergen and Oppedal
Year opened:
1989
Length:
2,390m
Portal height level:
57 / 257m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
1,438
Share of HGVs:
14%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
0 / 0 / 0
Risk:
Low
Strengths and weaknesses
Emergency phones provided every 500 metres and fire extinguishers every 250 metres
Escape route signs show the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Lighting is too weak
Lanes are relatively narrow: 2.90 metres wide
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
No loudspeakers
No video surveillance
No automatic detection of emergency phone or fire extinguisher use
No emergency lighting
No lay-bys
No additional escape or rescue routes
No evacuation lighting to mark escape routes in the tunnel
No automatic fire alarm system
Ventilation is not powerful enough to cope with a fire, ventilation control is not effective enough
No continuous fire-fighting water supply in the tunnel, no hydrants
No system in place to quickly drain flammable and toxic liquids
The power supply and local power supply are not protected against power cuts
Radio communications are not possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
No regular emergency drills
The maximum time of use for the fire brigade's respiratory equipment is too short
Plans for the future
By 2017:
Escape routes to be marked by evacuation lighting
Installation of video surveillance with automatic detection of traffic disruptions, communication systems and evacuation lighting
New emergency phones to be installed
Two lay-bys to be installed
Briefly and to the point
The low risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the low volume of traffic of around 1,500 vehicles per day with bi-directional traffic. The tunnel, however, is 2.4 kilometres long, has a gradient of 8% and a HGV share of 14 percent.
Preventive measures are limited to the presence of trained staff in the tunnel control centre which is manned around the clock. Apart from this, lanes are relatively narrow and lighting is too weak. There are neither lay-bys nor video surveillance.
Incidents in the tunnel are not automatically reported to the tunnel control centre. Tunnel staff are forced to rely on reports made by motorists using either the emergency phones or their own mobile phones. Due to the lack of video surveillance, the tunnel control centre is unable to gain a complete picture of the situation in the tunnel. Motorists are guided, if necessary, merely by traffic lights at the portals. Fire-fighting is difficult due to the lack of fire-fighting water in the tunnel. At least an emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in a fire need to be improved badly. The ventilation section, which is 2,390 metres long, cannot prevent smoke located a long distance from the seat of the fire from moving downwards from the tunnel ceiling. Moreover, longitudinal flow in the tunnel is not considered in ventilation control. These two aspects can lead to smoke spreading throughout the entire tunnel and this is dangerous in light of the long distance to be covered to the portals.
Norway, near Matre
E 39 between Bergen and Oppedal
Year opened:
1981
Length:
1,395m
Portal height level:
33 / 110m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
1,470
Share of HGVs:
14%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
0 / 0 / 0
Risk:
Low
Strengths and weaknesses
Emergency phones provided every 500 metres and fire extinguishers every 250 metres
Escape route signs show the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Lighting is too weak
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
No loudspeakers
No video surveillance
No automatic detection of emergency phone or fire extinguisher use
No emergency lighting
No lay-bys
No additional escape or rescue routes
No evacuation lighting to mark escape routes in the tunnel
No automatic fire alarm system
No fire ventilation
Safety-relevant cables are not sufficiently fire-resistant
No continuous fire-fighting water supply in the tunnel, no hydrants
No system in place to quickly drain flammable and toxic liquids
The power supply and local power supply are not protected against power cuts
Radio communications are not possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
No regular emergency drills
The maximum time of use for the fire brigade's respiratory equipment is too short
Plans for the future
By 2017:
Escape routes to be marked by evacuation lighting
Installation of video surveillance with automatic detection of traffic disruptions, ventilation system, communication systems and evacuation lighting
New emergency phones to be installed
Installation of a lay-by
Briefly and to the point
The low risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the low traffic volume of around 1,500 vehicles per day with bi-directional traffic, and a tunnel length of only 1.4 kilometres. However, the tunnel has a gradient of 8 percent and a HGV share of 14 percent.
Preventive measures are limited to sufficiently wide lanes and the presence of trained staff in the tunnel control centre which is manned around the clock. Apart from this, lighting is too weak, lay-bys are missing and there is no video surveillance.
Incidents in the tunnel are not automatically reported to the tunnel control centre. Tunnel staff are forced to rely on reports made by motorists using either the emergency phones or their own mobile phones. Due to the lack of video surveillance, the tunnel control centre is unable to gain a complete picture of the situation in the tunnel. Motorists are guided, if necessary, only by traffic lights at the portals. Fire-fighting is difficult due to the lack of fire-fighting water in the tunnel. At least an emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in the event of fire are insufficient. Smoke cannot be precisely extracted from the tunnel. In addition to this, people can only escape through the portals.
Croatia, near Vrbovsko
A 6 between Zagreb and Rijeka
Year opened:
North tube in 2004/ south tube in 2007
Length:
1,130m
Portal height level:
494 / 473m above sea level
Number of tubes:
2 / unidirectional traffic
Speed limit:
100kph
Vehicles per day:
10,750
Share of HGVs:
15%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
8 / 0 / 0
Risk:
Low
Strengths and weaknesses
Two tubes with cross-connections as additional escape and rescue routes every 320 metres max.
Traffic lights and barriers in front of the portals
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Lay-bys in the middle of the tunnel
Sound-insulated emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 300 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Rescue route for emergency service vehicles leading to neighbouring tube located in the middle of the tunnel
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
No loudspeakers
Distance between emergency phones and fire extinguishers is 300 metres and hence relatively long
The maximum time of use for the fire brigade's respiratory equipment is too short
Briefly and to the point
The low risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the low traffic volume of around 11,000 vehicles per day with unidirectional traffic and a tunnel length of only 1.1 kilometres. The HGV share, however, is 15 percent.
Unidirectional traffic, sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the very good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs along with information provided via traffic radio. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. An emergency response plan and regular drills ensure good co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services.
In the event of fire, there are good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system draws smoke out of the tube affected in the direction of traffic to a zone where there are usually no people.Anybody downstream from the fire is located in a smoke-free zone and can leave the tunnel through the clearly marked emergency exits.
Traffic lights and barriers in front of the portals
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel
Full video surveillance
Emergency phones provided every 160 metres and fire extinguishers every 40 metres
Escape route signs show the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, ventilation is automatically activated
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock
Congestion every day
The operator is unable to broadcast messages on traffic radio
No loudspeakers
No automatic detection of traffic, traffic disruptions, nor of emergency phone or fire extinguisher use
No emergency walkways
No additional escape or rescue routes
No evacuation lighting to mark escape routes in the tunnel
In the event of fire, the tunnel is not automatically closed
No central monitoring of the tunnel (operating equipment supplied by the operator, traffic systems by the police)
Radio communications are not possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
No emergency response plan
No regular training for tunnel staff
No regular emergency drills
No information available concerning respiratory protection for the fire brigade
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the ban on both HGVs and the transport of hazardous goods. However, the traffic volume of around 33,000 vehicles per day with bi-directional traffic is high.
Preventive measures are poor. Daily congestion is the result of too much traffic in the single-tube tunnel. Monitoring is also insufficient. Sufficiently wide lanes and lighting were positively rated.
Incidents in the tunnel are not automatically reported to the tunnel control centre. Apart from this, traffic lights and variable traffic signs are only located at the portals. Neither traffic radio nor loudspeakers are provided to inform motorists if necessary. At least an automatic fire alarm system detects fires and activates ventilation. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. There is no specific emergency response plan nor are drills conducted regularly, so that co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services is not co-ordinated.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in the event of fire need to be improved. The ventilation system extracts smoke near the seat of the fire out of the tunnel, permitting people to go to a mostly smoke-free area, however, this is only possible via the portals which could be quite a long distance away. There are no additional emergency exits. Apart from this, there is no evacuation lighting for the escape route.
Two tubes with cross-connections as additional escape and rescue routes every 100 metres
Traffic lights and variable information displays in front of the portals
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of emergency phones and fire extinguishers
Emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 60 metres
Automatic fire detection using video surveillance
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communication possible throughout the tunnel for both the police and the fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Congestion every day
Lanes are relatively narrow: 2.85 metres wide
The operator is unable to broadcast messages on traffic radio
No automatic traffic detection
Emergency phones are not clearly marked
No evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, nor signs showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
Smoke and heat can penetrate the external escape routes
Ventilation is not powerful enough to deal with a fire, ventilation control is not effective enough
Radio communication is not possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel personnel
No regular emergency drills
The maximum time of use for the fire brigade's respiratory equipment is too short
Plans for the future
Escape route signs to show the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
Installation of loudspeakers
New doors for emergency exits
Improved incident management
Strategy for emergency drills
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the length of the tunnel, just 1 kilometre, a low HGV share of 2.9 percent and the widely restricted transport of hazardous goods. However, the traffic volume of around 56,000 vehicles per day with unidirectional traffic is high.
The preventive measures must be individually evaluated. Unidirectional traffic, lighting and video surveillance of the tunnel by trained staff in the tunnel control centre, which is manned around the clock, are positive measures. Relatively narrow lanes and daily congestion due to extremely heavy traffic were negative findings.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights only and are provided with information by information displays at the portals. Video surveillance can be used to detect fires, ventilation and closing the tunnel must be manually activated. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. At least an emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in the event of fire need to be improved. Although the ventilation system extracts smoke from the tunnel, the extraction volume is too low. Apart from this, longitudinal flow in the tunnel is not considered in ventilation control. This can lead to smoke spreading throughout the tunnel. But at least during the early phase of a fire, people can leave the tunnel through the emergency exits via a largely smoke-free atmosphere.
Border tunnel between Slovenia and Austria
A 1/ A 11, Jesenice / Slovenia - Villach / Austria
Year opened:
1990
Length:
7,864m
Portal height level:
655 / 621m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
80kph
Vehicles per day:
6,377
Share of HGVs:
17%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
15 / 2 / 1
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Lay-bys provided at least every 1,060 metres
Sound-insulated emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 212 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Fire brigade is well-trained and well-equipped
Lighting is too weak
No additional escape or rescue routes
!
Knock-out criterion! The test result was lowered from Good to Acceptable due to the very poor result in the Escape and rescue routes category (refer to Methodology: How we tested).
Plans for the future
2008:
Lighting is to be improved
Installation of a traffic control system
By 2019:
Revision of the ventilation strategy in the middle section of the tunnel
New fire alarm system and new fire-fighting water supply
Installation of video surveillance with image analysis
In discussion:
Construction of a safety gallery or a second tube
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the relatively low volume of traffic of around 6,400 vehicles per day with bi-directional traffic. The HGV share of 17% is relatively high and the tunnel is relatively long: 7.9 kilometres. There are no restrictions on the transport of hazardous goods.
Sufficiently wide lanes and lay-bys are the main reasons for the acceptable rating for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff. Lighting, however, is too weak.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs along with information provided via traffic radio and loudspeakers. An automatic fire alarm system detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. Good training and equipment for the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. An emergency response plan and regular drills ensure good co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in the event of fire need to be improved. The ventilation system extracts smoke from the tunnel, however, not in the around 1-kilometre long middle section of the tunnel. Effective measures are required here to prevent smoke and heat from spreading. People caught in the zones upstream or downstream from this area can leave the tunnel through a mostly smoke-free zone, however, this means having to go to the portals which may be quite a long distance away. There are no additional emergency exits.
Italy, near Lecco
SS 36 between Lecco and Ballabio
Year opened:
2005
Length:
3,300m
Portal height level:
230 / 410m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
70kph
Vehicles per day:
13,000
Share of HGVs:
6%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
0 / 0 / 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
No hazardous goods transported through the tunnel
Traffic lights and variable information displays in front of the portals
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Lay-bys provided every 600 metres
Emergency phones provided every 250 metres and fire extinguishers every 57 metres
Emergency exits provided every 330 to 450 metres
Escape route signs show the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Rescue route for emergency service vehicles located 2,000 metres maximum from one portal
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
No loudspeakers
No evacuation lighting to mark escape routes in the tunnel
No regular training for tunnel staff
No regular emergency drills
No information available concerning respiratory protection for the fire brigade
Plans for the future
End of 2008: Installation of a mobile radio system
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the traffic volume of around 13,000 vehicles per day with bi-directional traffic, a HGV share of almost 6 percent, a tunnel length of around 3.3 kilometres and a gradient of 6 percent. Hazardous goods cannot be transported through the tunnel.
Sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs, information is also provided by information displays at the portals. An automatic fire alarm system is installed to detect fires. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. At least an emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services.
In the event of fire, there are good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system extracts the smoke near the seat of the fire out of the tunnel. This means that people in the tube can use the emergency exits and escape through a largely smoke-free environment.
Italy, near La Spezia
NSA 303 between La Spezia and Riccò del Golfo
Year opened:
2007
Length:
2,436m
Portal height level:
200 / 250m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
70kph
Vehicles per day:
2,400
Share of HGVs:
4%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
0 / 0 / 0
Risk:
Low
Strengths and weaknesses
Traffic lights and variable information displays in front of the portals
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-bys and fire extinguishers
Lay-bys provided every 400 metres
Fire extinguishers provided every 400 metres
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated, the tunnel closed and the fire brigade is notified
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
No loudspeakers
No emergency phones
Distance between fire extinguishers of 400 metres is too long
No additional escape or rescue routes
No evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, nor signs showing the escape direction and distance to the portals
No tunnel control centre
Radio communications are not possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
No emergency response plan
No regular training for tunnel personnel
No regular emergency drills
!
Knock-out criterion! The test result was lowered from Poor to Very poor due to the very poor result in the categories of Escape and rescue routes, Incident management and Communication (refer to Methodology: How we tested).
Plans for the future
By the end of 2009:
Link to the future tunnel control centre in Genoa with activation of automatic image analysis of video surveillance
Installation of a diesel generator
Briefly and to the point
The low risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the low traffic volume of around 2,400 vehicles per day with bi-directional traffic, a low HGV share of 4 percent and a tunnel gradient of 4 percent. Although there are no restrictions on the transport of hazardous goods, hazardous goods are not transported very often.
Sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. Although video surveillance is installed, there is currently still no tunnel control centre where the data could be gathered.
Incidents in the tunnel are currently neither automatically reported nor analysed. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs, information is also provided by information displays at the portals. An automatic fire alarm system at least detects fires, activates ventilation, closes the tunnel and notifies the fire brigade. The tunnel has its own supply of fire-fighting water. However, there is no specific emergency response plan nor are drills conducted regularly, so that co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services is not co-ordinated.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in the event of fire need to be improved. The ventilation system extracts smoke near the seat of the fire out of the tunnel, permitting people to go to a mostly smoke-free area, however, this is only possible via the portals which could be quite a long distance away. There are no additional emergency exits.
Italy, near Menaggio
SS 340 between Menaggio and Colico
Year opened:
2004
Length:
3,536m
Portal height level:
200 / 200m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
70kph
Vehicles per day:
12,000
Share of HGVs:
6%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
2 / 3 / 0
Risk:
Low
Strengths and weaknesses
Traffic lights and variable information displays in front of the portals
Lay-bys provided every 500 metres
Emergency phones provided every 550 metres and fire extinguishers every 70 metres
Emergency exit provided
Escape route signs show the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into the external escape route, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Congestion every day
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
No loudspeakers
No video surveillance
No automatic detection of traffic, traffic disruptions, nor of lay-by, emergency phone or fire extinguisher use
The distance of up to 550 metres between emergency exits is too long
The distance of up to 2,000 metres between emergency exits is too long
No evacuation lighting to mark escape routes in the tunnel
Ventilation is not powerful enough to deal with a fire, ventilation control is not effective enough
Safety-relevant cables are not sufficiently fire-resistant
Radio communications are not possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
No emergency response plan
No regular training for tunnel personnel
No regular emergency drills
No information available concerning respiratory protection for the fire brigade
Plans for the future
2009: Installation of video surveillance, a traffic radio system and automatic information systems
Briefly and to the point
The low risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the traffic volume of around 12,000 vehicles per day with bi-directional traffic, a HGV share of 6 percent, a tunnel length of 3.5 kilometres and a ban on the transport of hazardous goods.
Sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff. However, there is no video surveillance system.
Incidents in the tunnel are not automatically reported to the tunnel control centre. Tunnel staff are forced to rely on reports made by motorists using either the emergency phones or their own mobile phones. Due to the lack of video surveillance, the tunnel control centre is unable to gain a complete picture of the situation in the tunnel. Motorists are guided, if necessary, only by traffic lights at the portals. An automatic fire alarm system at least detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. However, there is no specific emergency response plan nor are drills conducted regularly, so that co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services is not co-ordinated.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in the event of fire are insufficient. Although the ventilation system extracts smoke out of the tunnel, it is not possible to contain the spread of smoke. Apart from this, the distance between the only emergency exit and the portals is too long.
Italy, near Contursi Terme
A 3 between Salerno and Reggio Calabria
Year opened:
2007
Length:
1,215m
Portal height level:
90 / 90m above sea level
Number of tubes:
2 / unidirectional traffic
Speed limit:
130kph
Vehicles per day:
45,000
Share of HGVs:
16.1%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
0 / 0 / 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
Two tubes with a cross-connections in the middle of the tunnel serving as an additional escape and rescue route
Traffic lights and variable information displays in front of the portals
Emergency phones and fire extinguishers provided every 150 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into the external escape route, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system, in the event of fire, fire ventilation is automatically activated and the tunnel closed
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Rescue service vehicles can cross at the portals
Rescue route for emergency service vehicles leading to neighbouring tube located in the middle of the tunnel
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
No loudspeakers
No video surveillance
No automatic detection of emergency phone or fire extinguisher use
The distance of up to 640 metres between emergency exits is too long
Radio communications are not possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
No regular emergency drills
The time it takes the fire brigade to arrive is too long: 25 minutes
Plans for the future
2008: Strategy for annual emergency drills
2009: Installation of video surveillance with image analysis and a system for traffic radio
The tunnel was not completed at the time of testing. After completion of the work planned at the end of 2009, the overall rating will be much higher.
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the relatively high traffic volume of around 45,000 vehicles per day with unidirectional traffic, a HGV share of 16 percent and the unrestricted transport of hazardous goods.
Unidirectional traffic, sufficiently wide lanes, and lighting are the main reasons for the good result for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff. However, there is no video surveillance system.
At present, incidents in the tunnel are not automatically reported to the tunnel control centre. Tunnel staff are forced to rely on reports made by motorists using either the emergency phones or their own mobile phones. Since there is still no video surveillance, the tunnel control centre is unable to gain a complete picture of the situation in the tunnel. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs along with information provided via information displays. An automatic fire alarm system at least detects fires, activates ventilation, and closes the tunnel. The long time which it takes for the fire brigade to arrive makes fire fighting more difficult even though the tunnel has its own supply of fire-fighting water. At least an emergency response plan co-ordinates co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in the event of fire need to be improved. The ventilation system draws smoke out of the tube affected in the direction of traffic to a zone where there are usually no people.Anybody downstream from the fire is located in a smoke-free zone and can leave the tunnel through the emergency exits. The distance between emergency exits, however, is too long.
Italy, near Cernobbio
SS 340 between Cernobbio and Confine di Stato
Year opened:
1983
Length:
2,400m
Portal height level:
202 / 248m above sea level
Number of tubes:
1 / bi-directional traffic
Speed limit:
70kph
Vehicles per day:
18,000
Share of HGVs:
15%
Breakdowns / accidents / fires:
2 / 1 / 0
Risk:
Medium
Strengths and weaknesses
No hazardous goods transported through the tunnel
Lay-bys provided every 700 metres
Emergency exit provided
Rescue route for emergency service vehicles around 1,800 metres from the portals
Congestion every day
Traffic radio cannot be received throughout the tunnel
No loudspeakers
No video surveillance
No automatic detection of traffic, traffic disruptions or emergencies
No emergency phones
No fire extinguishers
Distance from the emergency exit to the portals is around 1,800 metres and hence too long
No evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, nor signs showing the escape direction and distance to the portals
Smoke and heat can penetrate the external escape routes
No automatic fire alarm system
In the event of fire, fire ventilation is not automatically activated and the tunnel is not closed
Ventilation is not powerful enough to deal with a fire, ventilation control is not effective enough
Safety-relevant cables are not sufficiently fire-resistant
The power supply is not protected against power cuts
No tunnel control centre
Radio communications are not possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
No emergency response plan
No regular training for tunnel staff
No regular emergency drills
No information available concerning respiratory protection for the fire brigade
Plans for the future
2010:
Fire ventilation to be changed to smoke extraction
Installation of video surveillance, emergency phones, fire extinguishers and an automatic fire alarm system
Link to the tunnel control centre in Bellano
Briefly and to the point
The medium risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the relatively high traffic volume of around 18,000 vehicles per day with bi-directional traffic, a relatively high HGV share of 15% and a tunnel length of around 2.4 kilometres. There is a ban on the transport of hazardous goods.
Sufficiently wide lanes and lay-bys are the main reasons for the acceptable result for preventive measures. The lighting installed meets with the minimum requirements. However, there is no tunnel control centre and no video surveillance system.
Incidents in the tunnel are not automatically detected. Tunnel staff are forced to rely on reports made by motorists using mobile phones. Motorists are guided, if necessary, merely by traffic lights at the portals. The tunnel has its own supply of fire-fighting water. However, there is no specific emergency response plan nor are drills conducted regularly, so that co-operation between the tunnel control centre and emergency services is not co-ordinated.
The necessary preconditions for effective self-rescue in the event of fire are insufficient. The ventilation system can only push smoke out of the tube affected by the fire, however, airflow and control are not sufficient. Because the escape route is also long, it is almost impossible to leave the tunnel through a smoke-free environment. There is no effective smoke extraction or additional emergency exits.
Traffic lights and barriers in front of the portals
Traffic radio throughout the tunnel, the operator can broadcast messages
Full video surveillance
Automatic detection of traffic disruptions, as well as the use of lay-bys, emergency phones or fire extinguishers
Lay-bys provided every 310 metres
Emergency phones provided every 160 metres and fire extinguishers every 45 metres
Emergency exits provided every 160 metres
Evacuation lighting for tunnel escape routes, showing the escape direction and distance to the nearest exit
No smoke or heat can penetrate into external escape routes, doors are sufficiently fire-resistant
Automatic fire alarm system
Ventilation is powerful enough to deal with a fire
Rescue route for emergency service vehicles in the middle of the tunnel
Tunnel control centre manned around the clock by trained staff
Radio communications possible throughout the tunnel for tunnel staff, police and fire brigade
Up-to-date and complete emergency response plan
Regular training for tunnel staff
Regular emergency drills
The maximum time of use for the fire brigade's respiratory equipment is too short
Briefly and to the point
Despite the maximum gradient of 7 percent, the low risk found for driving through the tunnel was primarily due to the traffic volume of around 13,000 vehicles per day with bi-directional traffic, and a tunnel length of only around 1.3 kilometres. There is also a ban on both HGVs and the transport of hazardous goods.
Sufficiently wide lanes, lay-bys and lighting are the main reasons for the very good rating for preventive measures. The tunnel is monitored around the clock in a tunnel control centre manned by trained staff.
Incidents in the tunnel are automatically reported to the tunnel control centre by video link. If necessary, motorists are guided using traffic lights and variable traffic signs, as well as by information displays at the portals, traffic radio and via loudspeakers. An automatic fire alarm system is installed to detect fires. The short distance to be covered by the fire brigade and the supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel ensure effective fire fighting. An emergency response plan and regular drills ensure good co-operation between the tunnel control centre and the emergency services.
In the event of fire, there are good necessary preconditions in place for effective self-rescue. The ventilation system ensures stable smoke layering, so that escape to the emergency exits located short distances apart is possible through a mostly smoke-free zone.
EuroTAP - The Future of Tunnel Testing
